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Abstract
This study offers insights into how news media frames interact with existing value 
orientations in shaping voter preferences. It is assumed that a framing effect should 
be more pronounced when frames in the news resonate with people’s existing value 
predispositions. These assumptions were tested in a real-world setting of a political 
campaign dealing with the issue of naturalization of immigrants. Based on a data set in 
which the data of a two-wave panel survey were matched with content analytic data, 
the present research demonstrated frame-resonance effects for news reporting about 
the pro campaign. That is, framing the issue in terms of the notion that people should 
have the final say in naturalization procedures shaped voting preferences only for 
voters whose basic values of social order, tradition, and security (high authoritarians) 
were touched. In contrast, a main effect of the opponents’ framing in the news on 
voting preferences was found. Thus, the majority followed the framing of the opponents 
who put emphasis on a fair and pragmatic solution of the naturalization issue.
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Research from several decades has demonstrated that values are important backstops 
of political beliefs and opinions (Feldman, 2003; McClosky & Zaller, 1984). Values 
can be considered as stable guiding principles that are ordered hierarchically. 
More precisely, values refer to desirable goals that transcend specific situations 
(Kluckhohn, 1951; Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 1992). Public opinion surveys clearly 
demonstrate that cherished values shape opinions toward public policy issues. For 
instance, traditionalism and individualism are important predictors of people’s opin-
ion in the abortion discourse (Ball-Rokeach, Power, Guthrie, & Waring, 1990). Given 
that people stick to their cherished values in political debates, it is no surprise that 
communicators regularly draw on the power of value-based language to persuade 
them (Domke, McCoy, & Torres, 1999; Gamson, 1992). Or, as Nelson and Garst 
(2005, p. 490) put it “values, therefore, are powerful and reliable weapons in the 
persuader’s arsenal.”
Previous research has convincingly demonstrated that communicators are more 
likely to affect opinion formation of audience members when they frame a political 
issue in terms of specific values (Shah, Domke, & Wackman, 1996; Shen & Edwards, 
2005). This kind of strategic communication has also been termed value framing 
(Ball-Rokeach et al., 1990; Chong & Druckman, 2007b; Shah et al., 1996). Value 
frames involve linking value positions to the construction of political debates to provide 
a compelling interpretative framework that facilitates the understanding of a given 
policy conflict (Ball-Rokeach et al., 1990; Domke, Shah, & Wackman, 1998). Typically, 
value frames depict debates about public policy issues as clashes of deep-rooted val-
ues. In these debates, political actors compete for the “legitimacy of one definition 
of morality and/or competence over another in the struggle to win or control scarce 
resources” (Ball-Rokeach et al., 1990, p. 254).
Experimental studies suggest that associating political positions to basic values 
activates value orientations, which in turn serve as easily accessible heuristics shaping 
people’s interpretations and judgments of political issues (Domke et al., 1998; Shah 
et al., 1996; Shen & Edwards, 2005). Based on this activation-accessibility explana-
tion, most studies have shown that framing an issue in terms of values can enhance the 
accessibility of this value position, thereby affecting the judgments about gay rights 
(Brewer, 2003), immigration (Domke et al., 1999), attitudes toward welfare policy 
(Shen & Edwards, 2005), or candidate decision making (Shah et al., 1996).
Although the cumulative evidence of previous studies suggests that framing effects 
can be quite powerful, some scholars argue that the conditions simulated in laboratory 
settings do not compare with real-life political communication (Chong & Druckman, 
2007a, 2007b; Druckman, 2004; Kinder, 2007). Accordingly, communication in real 
campaigns is two-sided, whereas most experiments expose subjects to one-sided com-
munication. Additionally, in most experiments individuals are exposed to a single news 
story, whereas in reality the audience is exposed to hundreds of stories in the course of 
a political campaign. Finally, in real campaigns individuals are involved in interper-
sonal communication, which can correct media framing effects. Consequently, Kinder 
(2007, p. 158) has argued that these findings “do not speak convincingly to the presen-
tation of frames in everyday life.” As a reaction to these shortcomings, scholars have 
called for studies that strengthen the external validity by exploring value framing 
effects in the context of real campaigns or by using more representative samples 
(Kinder, 2007; Matthes, 2008; Richardson, 2005). This is the starting point of the 
present study. It extends previous research by testing value framing effects outside the 
laboratory. Specifically, by combining a content analysis with data from a panel 
survey, the study tests the interplay of value frames in the news and the value 
orientations of audience members.
Literature Review
A plethora of studies have shown that news media’s emphasizing a specific issue 
while ignoring others strongly influences people’s thinking and judgments of political 
issues (for an overview, see Chong & Druckman, 2007b; Entman, 1993; Iyengar, 
1991; Matthes, 2008; Nelson, Oxley, & Clawson, 1997). Dozens of experiments have 
found that the framing of news stories in terms of deep-rooted political values can 
directly shape public opinion about different attitudinal objects, such as political candi-
dates (Shah et al., 1996), ethnic minorities (Domke et al., 1999; Igartua & Cheng, 2009), 
political interest groups (Nelson, Clawson, & Oxley, 1997), welfare policy (Shen & 
Edwards, 2005), or mandatory minimum sentencing (Gross, 2008).
Boundary Conditions of Framing Effects
However, additional research indicates that audience members differ in their suscep-
tibility to value framing effects (see Druckman, 2001, for an overview). A bulk of 
studies convincingly demonstrates that value orientations (Shah et al., 1996; Shen & 
Edwards, 2005), existing attitudes (Brewer, 2001; Keum et al., 2005), and political 
sophistication (Barker, 2005; Brewer, 2003) moderate framing effects on judgments 
about public policy issues.
For instance, findings by Shah and colleagues (1996) suggest that individuals are 
motivated processors who interpret news items against the background of their own 
self-concept. In a first step, they showed that the framing of a news story about health 
care significantly affected the interpretation of the story and subsequent decision mak-
ing. One group of subject read a news story framed as a conflict of values, the other 
group read the story framed in material terms. The value frame addressed the health 
care issue as a matter of morals and human rights. In the material frame condition, the 
story was “presented in terms of economics, expedience, and practicality” (Shah et al., 
1996, p. 520). The results showed that the recipients of the value frame interpreted the 
news story in terms of values, whereas the readers of the material frame formed a 
pragmatic interpretation of the health care issue. To investigate the role of value orien-
tations in thinking, the authors relied on two different groups of respondents: under-
graduate students and evangelical Christians. As expected, the authors found that the 
latter group was more likely to interpret the news story in moral terms, whereas the 
students relied on a pragmatic interpretation.
A study by Shen and Edwards (2005) in the context of the welfare reform showed 
that message recipients who endorsed individualistic values were influenced by a 
news story that frames welfare recipients as self-reliant individuals who should be 
required to work to improve their situation. Other studies also suggest that value 
frames that resonate with individuals’ predisposition are more likely to shape the inter-
pretation and judgments about an issue compared to appeals that do not resonate with 
predispositions (Domke et al., 1999; Keum et al., 2005).
The reason for this value framing resonance effect is that existing value predisposi-
tions make value-laden considerations more accessible because they are in a state 
of chronic accessibility (Shen & Edwards, 2005). In other words, when message recip-
ients are exposed to value-laden frames in the news that correspond with their cogni-
tive value structure, then their value-laden considerations are more easily activated 
and, thus, more accessible for judgment formation compared to message recipients 
who are low in chronic accessibility of this value orientation. Put differently, temporal 
accessibility induced by the media frame and chronic accessibility due to the existing 
value structure exert additive effects on judgment formation.1
Need for Nonexperimental Evidence 
in the Study of Framing Effects
So far, framing effects research has produced valuable findings about the processes 
and conditions that contribute to variability in public opinion about policy issues. A 
main caveat of extant research refers to the external validity of findings (Kinder, 2007; 
Matthes, 2008; Richardson, 2005; Shen & Edwards, 2005). Specifically, Richardson 
(2005) argues that the use of a convenience sample “limits the ability to generalize 
from a specific message to a targeted message population” (p. 522). Matthes (2008) 
adds that the failure to consider real-world contexts may result in an overrating of 
media power to manipulate public opinion (see also Kinder, 2007). Two other issues 
have been brought up that question the mundane reality of the experimental results 
presented in the previous sections (see also Druckman, 2001).
On one hand, most studies relied on one-trial exposure to a frame in the news. Thus, 
we know comparably little about repeated exposures and cumulative effects (but see 
Chong & Druckman, 2007a). At least some experiments suggest that direct effects of 
framing on attitudes are weak or even absent when recipients are exposed to cross-
cutting communication (e.g., pro and con arguments) about an issue (Brewer, 2001; Cho, 
De Zuniga, Shah, & McLeod, 2006; Lee, McLeod, & Shah, 2008; Richardson, 2005). 
On the other hand, previous research gives only scant indication of the longevity of 
framing effects (Sotirovic, 2000). Only a few studies include tests of long-term effects 
of experimental framing manipulations. De Vreese (2004) showed that framing effects 
vanish within 1 week. Another study provides tentative evidence that at least strong 
frames may survive more than 3 weeks even if their impact decreased (Tewksbury, 
Jones, Peske, Raymond, & Vig, 2000). All these findings referred to above are limited 
with respect to the external validity and generality of framing effects. Therefore, the 
aim of our study is to test value framing effects in an externally valid setting. Specifically, 
the present study will test the effects of the interplay of value frames and individuals’ 
value predispositions on public opinion in the course of real political campaign about 
immigration policy.
Theoretical Assumptions
The present research is based on the assumption that political actors or parties typically 
invoke deep-rooted values in their attempt to promote a particular definition of an 
issue in the public (Ball-Rokeach et al., 1990; Entman, 1993). By associating policy 
issues to values political actors try to legitimize certain policy positions and, ulti-
mately, to gain support for their position. Even if political actors do not directly frame 
their messages in terms of basic values, journalists tend to structure the political dis-
course in terms of such values (e.g., Lee et al., 2008). The framing of an issue in terms 
of cherished values promotes the activation of values in the cognitive structure of 
recipients resulting in a temporal accessibility of those beliefs. Provided that these 
values are accessible and applicable to a given attitude object, individuals are likely 
to use these values in subsequent information processing and judgment formation 
(Domke et al., 1999; Iyengar, 1991).
This reasoning suggests a main effect of value frames on opinion formation. 
However, most studies that found main effects of value-laden frames exposed sub-
jects to news stories that were framed in a one-sided fashion (e.g., Igartua & Cheng, 
2009; Shen & Edwards, 2005). In contrast, experiments in which subjects were 
exposed to two-sided framing (i.e., stories that contain pro and con frames) failed to 
show main effects of the value frames (Brewer, 2001; Cho et al., 2006; Lee et al., 
2008; Richardson, 2005). In real campaigns, the exposure to one-sided or two-sided 
communication may vary from individual to individual. Given that in political con-
tests at least a part of the audience is exposed to a one-sided framing in the news, it can 
be assumed that value frames exert a direct effect on judgment formation. Therefore, 
we hypothesize a main effect of value frames on people’s political preferences 
(Hypothesis 1).
In addition, some studies found that value frames exert a stronger attitudinal impact 
when there is a match between value endorsement and value framing in the news 
(Domke et al., 1999; Shen & Edwards, 2005). Put differently, when value frames in the 
news and value orientations resonate, then political messages will be more persuasive. 
However, the direction of the effect strongly depends on the value that people endorse 
and the direction of the value appeal. For instance, political messages about a policy 
program (e.g., immigration policy restriction) are more persuasive for people whose 
value orientations already favor this position (e.g., conservative individuals). Thus, 
this thread of research suggests that value resonance—the match of value frame and 
value orientation—promotes persuasion. Therefore, the second hypothesis states that 
value frames that match with an existing value structure have a stronger impact on 
political preferences than value frames that do not match or mismatch with existing 
value orientations (Hypothesis 2).
Method
Context of the Study
The present study tests value framing effects in the context of a campaign dealing with 
the issue of immigration. More specifically, in this campaign the populist right in 
Switzerland fought for their initiative “for democratic naturalizations.” In Switzerland, 
the naturalization procedure is not only the result of an administrative process, but 
also a political decision that varies considerably in different municipalities. The natu-
ralization of immigrants can be based on decisions by a general assembly of local 
citizens, local parliaments or executives, or even by popular votes at the ballot box. 
In some municipalities, naturalization requests were rejected without justification. 
Therefore, the federal court decided that the rejection of naturalization requests 
required a justification. Furthermore, the court specified that a justification was not 
possible in a direct-democratic vote.
As a reaction to this decision, the populist right launched its popular initiative. 
They considered the court decision as a paternalistic act against the will of the 
Swiss people. Consequently, they claimed that the people should have the right to 
decide about the naturalization procedure (see Hänggli & Kriesi, in press). 
Furthermore, the initiative denies applicants to appeal a rejection of their natural-
ization request. The proponents of this initiative emphasized the importance of and 
respect for the people’s will in naturalization decisions (i.e., the “people final say” 
frame; see Hänggli & Kriesi, in press). At the same time, they warned against natu-
ralizations and naturalization of criminals when the naturalization procedure 
becomes a purely administrative act that cannot be influenced by the Swiss people 
(i.e., the “mass naturalization” frame). These appeals clearly address values of 
traditionalism, social dominance, and security. Therefore, this pattern of argumen-
tation of the populist right can be considered as a value frame (also see Gerth & 
Siegert, in press; Matthes, in press; Hänggli & Kriesi, in press; Wettstein, in press).
The opponents of the initiative formed a loose front of the political left, liberals, 
and Christian Democrats. There were different committees launching their own 
campaign with different strategies. However, all of these political actors countered the 
initiative of the populist right. Their main arguments stressed the need to guarantee a 
fair naturalization procedure in accordance with the rule of law (i.e., the “rule of law” 
frame). Discriminatory decisions should be ruled out. This pattern of arguments was a 
mixture of material and value framing in the terminology of previous studies (Domke 
et al., 1998; Shah et al., 1996). It was material in nature because it simply argued that 
democratic naturalizations did not conform to the rule of law and, therefore, could not 
be implemented. The opponents’ argumentation was also value-laden because it was 
stated that democratic naturalizations were unfair and contradicted human rights. The 
naturalization initiative was submitted to the Swiss people on June 1, 2008, and was 
rejected by a majority of 63.6% of the voters.
Content Analysis of News Media
For the content analysis of the news media, a total of 947 articles were coded between 
March 1 and May 31 (the day before the vote). The most important elite, free, and 
regional newspapers, tabloid news, Public Service TV news, and TV shows in the 
German- and the French-speaking part of the country were selected.2 The basic level 
of the content analysis was the argument expressed by a political actor or a journalist. 
An argument is defined as a verbalization of a specific point of view in which a claim 
is expressed with a certain evaluation (also see Matthes, in press). This understanding 
is largely consistent with the frame conceptualization by Entman (1993; see for a 
definition of single frame elements Matthes & Kohring, 2008). Often arguments are 
accompanied by propositions of possible solutions or the reasons of the problem. 
However, in our case, the solution that was proposed by proponents was nearly always 
embedded in the problem definition. According to the populist right, the adoption of 
the initiative favoring democratic naturalization is the solution to the problem. In 
contrast, for the opponents this solution was the main problem because in their view 
the naturalization proposal was incompatible with the rule of law. Therefore, the main 
patterns of arguments used by proponents and opponents form the frames employed 
by both sides that also occurred in the news media (see the Results section for the 
description of the specific frames). In sum, 4,496 arguments were coded by 10 
trained coders.3 In contrast to Hänggli and Kriesi (in press) and due to problems of 
multicollinearity in data matching, we only distinguish pro (i.e., “rule of law”) from 
contra (i.e., “people final say” plus “mass naturalization”) framing.
Panel Survey
A two-wave panel survey by means of computer-assisted telephone interviews was 
conducted. The first wave was fielded from April 7 to 25, 2008 (N = 1,251). The sec-
ond interview took place after the vote (i.e., after June 1, 2008; N = 999). The sample 
was recruited applying a random-quota procedure and is representative in terms of sex 
(51.3% female), age (M = 48.5, SD = 16.8), and residence. However, young people 
and people with lower educational degrees are slightly underrepresented in the second 
panel wave.
Measures
The central dependent variable was voting intention, measured with a single item on 
a 5-point scale (strongly in favor, slightly in favor, undecided/do not know, slightly 
opposed, strongly opposed). The dependent variable was asked in both panel wave 
and produced a test-retest reliability of .70. As independent variables, value orienta-
tions were assessed by using a three-item short form of right-wing authoritarianism 
(Altemeyer, 1996) (Cronbach’s alpha = .64). This construct was measured because 
high authoritarians have been shown to adhere to traditional values, tend to denigrate 
out-groups and minorities, and are submissive to authority figures.
A quite important measure was the use of or reliance on different communication 
channels and mass media. To link the panel study with the content analysis of the news 
media, we asked for the specific medium (TV and newspaper) that the interviewees 
used to keep informed during the campaign. As additional controls, we relied on mea-
sures of sex, age, education (highest educational degree), and political orientation on 
a 10-point scale (1 denotes left, 10 denotes right).
Data Analysis
The content analysis and the panel survey data were matched on the individual level. 
In this procedure, every survey participant was assigned a value representing the fre-
quency with which she or he was confronted with a certain frame of the pro or con 
camp. This matching was based on the specific news media use patterns that the survey 
respondents reported. The same procedure applies for the frequency of reporting of 
different news sources used by the audience and for different time intervals (before 
the first panel wave and between the first and the second panel wave). Consequently, 
the participants of our survey are matched with the media input that they were most 
likely to be confronted with. A similar procedure has been successfully adopted in 
previous studies (e.g., Dalton, Beck, & Huckfeldt, 1998; Matthes, 2008). The main 
advantage of this procedure is that voting preferences can be regressed on the specific 
content of news stories that people were exposed to before they were interviewed 
(Shoemaker & Reese, 1990).
Results
Content Analytic Results
In a first step, the content analytic data are presented in order to shed light on the media 
framing of proponents and opponents of the initiative. Table 1 shows the relative 
frequency of the most important arguments expressed in the campaign. The table 
indicates that the most important argument in the campaign overall was the central 
argument of the opponents. It emphasized that the rule of law should apply in natural-
ization procedures. When arguments against democratic naturalizations occurred in 
the news media, then in more than half of the cases (51.8%) they referred to the rule 
of law. The second most important argument against democratic naturalizations stated 
that arbitrary and discriminating naturalization decision should be avoided.
The most important argument of the supporters claimed that the Swiss people 
should have the final say in naturalization procedures. The frequency of this argument 
relative to all other pro arguments makes up a share of 43.4%. Their second and third 
most important arguments referred to the prevention of mass naturalizations and legal 
aspects of their initiative. These figures show that the discourse was structured by two 
Table 1. Relative Frequency of Pro and Con Arguments in News Media Reporting
Arguments Percentage relative to all arguments
Pro arguments 41.6
 People should have final say 18.1
 Prevent mass naturalizations 8.8
 Democratic naturalizations not appealable 8.1
 Delinquent immigrants 5.1
 Other pro arguments 1.5
Con arguments 58.4
 Rule of law 30.3
 No arbitrary decisions discriminating applicants 13.9
 Attacks against proponents 7.9
 Current naturalization practice sufficient 3.1
 Other con arguments 3.2
main frames. The framing of the populist right that promoted the idea that the people 
should have the final say. This framing was most dominant in the discourse promoting 
the popular initiative. The other arguments seldom occur without reference to this 
main frame. Thus, the central organizing idea structuring the argumentation of the sup-
porters was that the Swiss people should have the final say. Therefore, their strategy 
frame is henceforth termed “people final say.”
When the frequency of occurrence of the main arguments of the opponents’ news 
media framing is considered, then a similar picture emerges. Their argumentation was 
structured by the claim that naturalization procedures should be in accordance with the 
rule of law (e.g., with human rights) and that applicants should not be discriminated. 
Therefore, this framing is henceforth termed “rule of law” frame. For the subsequent 
analysis, the two main arguments forming the proponents’ and opponents’ frames were 
summed up to an index “final say of the people” and “rule of law,” respectively. The 
“people final say” frame includes the “mass naturalization” frame distinguished by 
Hänggli and Kriesi (in press). These content analytic categories are then matched to 
the survey data and serve as independent variables.
Hypothesis Tests
Given the nature of the data, the analysis is based on generalized estimating equations 
(GEE) with an identity link function. GEE are a generalization of the general linear 
model (GLM; see also Liang & Zeger, 1986). Specifically, GEE provide an extension 
of the GLM to longitudinal data when basic assumptions of the GLM are violated 
(e.g., nonnormal distribution of the dependent variable, correlations between the 
residuals of independents and the dependent variable, or inhomogeneity of the vari-
ance for the range of the dependent variable). For the subsequent analysis, the form 
Table 2. Results of a Generalized Estimating Equation (GEE) Model Testing Framing Effects 
on Voting Preferences
Independent Variable
Model 1 
Estimates (SE)
Model 2 
Estimates (SE)
Model 3 
Estimates (SE)
Model 4 
Estimates (SE)
Constant 3.40 (.04)*** 1.71 (.26)*** 2.07 (.29)*** 2.02 (.29)***
Sex .09 (.08) .09 (.08) .10 (.08)
Age .01 (.01)* .01 (.01) .01 (.01)
Education .45 (.07)*** .43 (.07)*** .44 (.07)***
Left-right self-positioning −.21 (.02)*** −.21 (.02)*** −.21 (.02)***
Authoritarianism −.29 (.05)*** −.28 (.05)*** −.28 (.05)***
Time .51 (.05)*** .32 (.09)*** .33 (.09)***
Pro frame “people final say” −.52 (.40) −.46 (.39)
Con frame “rule of law” .76 (.29)*** .66 (.29)**
Pro Frame × Authoritarianism −.27 (.09)**
Con Frame × Authoritarianism .09 (.35)
QICC 3,047.17 2,334.37 2,311.76 2,305.73
Corrected pseudo-R2 .23 .25 .26
Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients (standard errors are in parenthesis); QICC is the cor-
rected quasi-likelihood under the independence model criterion and is a derivation of Akaike’s informa-
tion criterion for GEE.
*p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .01.
of the serial correlation is assumed to be first-order autoregressive, although GEE 
yield consistent estimates of the regression coefficients even without stringent 
assumptions about the actual correlation structure (Liang & Zeger, 1986). Similar to 
mixed models, the fit of these models can only be estimated in relation to simpler 
models. Therefore, in a first step, an intercept-only model is estimated (see Table 2, 
second column). With the integration of additional independent variables the model 
should improve in predictive power. The results of these analyses are depicted in 
Table 2.
In the second model, the demographics and political predispositions are introduced 
as predictors. These predictors improve the explanatory power that can be seen when 
one compares the decrease in QICC (corrected quasi-likelihood under independence 
model criterion) or the corrected pseudo-R2. Although age and sex do not predict peo-
ple’s voting preferences, education and political predispositions do. In particular, low-
educated, conservative, and authoritarian respondents favor the proposal to introduce 
democratic naturalizations. In addition, the significant time effect indicates that people 
moved more to a rejection of the initiative in the course of the campaign.
The third model tests the effects of the value framing in the news. It was assumed 
that the value frames structuring the discourse in the news media should directly affect 
voting preferences. This hypothesis receives partial support. On one hand, the news 
framing of the adversaries of the popular initiative increases the opposition to the 
policy proposal. Audience members exposed to a news discourse that emphasized the 
rule of law and condemned discrimination were more likely to reject the proposal. On 
the other hand, we failed to find a direct effect of the framing of the issue in terms of 
people’s final say on voting preferences. Put differently, the news framing of the pro-
ponents of the popular initiative in the media did not affect voting preferences directly. 
This result contradicts the first hypothesis.
The second hypothesis states that news frames that match with an existing value 
structure have a stronger impact than value frames that mismatch. Thus, an interaction 
effect of value predisposition and news framing is hypothesized. Again, this hypothe-
sis is partially supported. An interaction effect of the “final-say” frame and authoritari-
anism is obtained in the fourth model. To facilitate the interpretation, Figure 1 shows 
the interaction effect graphically. This figure indicates that the proponents’ framing of 
the initiative affected only the voting intentions of high authoritarians. This is con-
firmed by an additional test of the slope of the framing effect for high authoritarians (z 
= −2.44, p < .05). Although the slope for moderate and low authoritarians also shows a 
decreasing trend with more frequent exposure to the final say frame, their voting prefer-
ences were not affected (z = −0.81 for moderates, and z = −1.16 for low authoritarians). 
Figure 1. Interaction effect of news framing and authoritarianism on voting preferences
Small values of the voting preference indicate support for the proposal.
This finding provides evidence for the assumption of value resonance: When the 
news framing (i.e., the final say frame) and value orientation (i.e., high authoritarian-
ism) matched, then support for the proposal of the populist right was high.
The second interaction term was not significant. Thus, authoritarianism did not 
moderate the effect of the “rule of law” frame on voting preferences. This result lends 
support to the notion that value predispositions and frames in the news that mismatch 
with existing value predispositions exert independent effects on voting preferences. 
Interestingly, this finding implies that high authoritarians were influenced by the 
framing of both parties, that is, proponents and opponents. Thus, even if their value 
predisposition made them responsive to value appeals of the populist right, they were 
obviously not so closed-minded to be immune against the news framing of the oppo-
nents. This finding is discussed in depth in the following section.
Discussion
The present study demonstrates direct value framing and resonance effects in the 
context of a direct-democratic campaign. Specifically, it shows direct framing effects 
of the news reporting about naturalization in terms of the rule of law on voting pref-
erences. Thus, the frequent exposure to the “rule of law” frame in the news increased 
the tendency of the voters to reject a more restrictive naturalization procedure. In 
contrast, the value-laden framing of the supporters of this proposal affected only the 
voting preferences of authoritarian individuals. This confirms the value-resonance 
hypothesis; that is, value appeals are more persuasive when value-laden messages 
match with the value orientations of recipients. In sum, the present findings corroborate 
the results of research that has been conducted exclusively in the laboratory (e.g., Lee 
et al., 2008; Shen & Edwards, 2005). Even under externally valid conditions of a real-
world campaign that is characterized by repeatedly cross-cutting communication, 
selective exposure, and interpersonal influences, news framing effects on public 
opinion do occur.
One of the main advantages of the present study was its unique research design. 
Whereas in most media effects studies in field settings attitudes were regressed on 
measures of media exposure, this study used measures of media content from a content 
analysis that was individually linked to the survey data. This procedure has the benefit 
that one knows the valence of the media content that is likely to affect attitudes of 
audience members. In contrast, studies that solely rely on measures of media use obvi-
ously confound the effects of exposure to the news with the effects of specific media 
content to which individuals are exposed. For campaigns with one-sided or consonant 
media reporting, there may be no difference between the present approach and analyses 
using only exposure measures. However, when communication is two-sided, the latter 
approach may underestimate real campaign effects. The reason is that the effects of 
mutually neutralizing communication effects remain unnoticed when public opinion 
is regressed on news exposure. As has been highly recommended by some scholars, 
this problem can be circumvented by integrating message content into survey data 
sets (Shoemaker & Reese, 1990).
Our study contradicts the findings of previous research which failed to find direct 
framing effects on policy attitudes (Domke et al., 1998, 1999; Shah et al., 1996). 
However, these studies were single-exposure experiments in which message recipi-
ents were exposed to a single news story that presented an issue in a controversial 
way. Given the lack of a clear attitudinal direction of the article in these experiments, 
subjects received no direct cue that may have guided their opinion formation. In con-
trast, framing experiments exposing individuals to one-sided communication clearly 
demonstrate that the news framing have a direct attitudinal impact (e.g., Igartua & 
Cheng, 2009; Shen & Edwards, 2005).
Thus, the study adds to extant research by showing that even when audience mem-
bers are exposed to two-sided communication in a real campaign, the repeated framing 
of an issue can finally shape preferences of voters. Thus, the context of real campaigns 
does not consequentially eliminate the effects of news framing on audience members’ 
preferences. This argument has been put forward by some scholars that have ques-
tioned the artificiality and lack of external validity of experiments (e.g., Druckman, 
2001; Kinder, 2007). This is both good and bad news in normative terms. It is good 
news because the study shows that voters cannot be simply manipulated by symbolic 
political propaganda. In contrast, judgment formation of the majority of the voters 
was influenced by the news framing that was promoted by the opponents of the policy 
proposal. However, it is also bad news because the news framing of the proponents of 
democratic naturalizations exploited existing value predispositions of authoritarian 
individuals. Thus, symbolic politics propaganda is likely to keep prejudice against out-
groups alive, at least for a minority of the population (Sears, 1994).
The previous reasoning suggests that voters found the con argumentation more 
convincing and more persuasive. There is ample experimental evidence showing that 
message recipients are active receivers deliberating about the importance of different 
considerations in the context of a given problem (Brewer, 2001; Nelson, Oxley et al., 
1997). In this perspective, framing effects are likely to be based on an explicit learning 
process in which people deliberate about pro and con arguments. However, other 
scholars argue that people simply follow the framing of the loudest political actors 
(Chong & Druckman, 2007a; Zaller, 1992), that is, in the present study the campaign 
of the opponents. In the present study, it cannot be distinguished whether voters 
consciously evaluated the persuasiveness of the news framing, whether they simply 
embraced the “loudest” position, or whether they followed group cues that were present 
in the news. Additional evidence from experiments is needed to elucidate the processes 
that may have produced the effects found in the present analysis. Specifically, future 
studies should explicitly test whether or for whom framing effects are based on auto-
matic accessibility or on belief importance.
Such conclusions notwithstanding, the finding that direct and interactive effects are 
obtained for different framing strategies requires further justification. Specifically, 
one may ask why the framing of the supporters of the proposal did not produce main 
effects. Furthermore, one may also wonder why the effect of the rule-of-law frame was 
not moderated. In the present campaign, the value-laden appeals of the supporters of 
democratic naturalizations were likely to be too extreme for the majority of the voters. 
Most voters may have realized that this popular initiative is only an attempt of the 
populist right to keep the immigration issue on the political agenda. Thus, when voters 
considered the popular initiative in more detail, they must have recognized that the 
initiative was in reality nothing more than populist propaganda to discriminate out-
groups. As voters may have exposed the initiative as symbolic politics that must not be 
taken seriously, they may have rejected it right away. A similar reasoning is put forward 
by Kinder (2007, p. 156): He argues that “if frames wander too far afield, they will be 
rejected.” And even if the people generally favored a more restrictive naturalization 
policy, they might have considered this proposal as difficult to implement. Therefore, 
most voters were not directly affected by the proponents’ framing of the proposal.
However, this framing found its most fertile soil in a minority of authoritarian vot-
ers. Their value predisposition resonated fairly well with the argumentation of the 
populist right. More precisely, people endorsing authoritarian values adhere to tradi-
tionalism, tend to discriminate out-groups, and are submissive to authority figures 
(Altemeyer, 1996). These needs were clearly satisfied by the present proposal because 
the procedures would have endowed the Swiss people as the dominant group with a 
means to dominate naturalization applicants. Given that this argumentation corre-
sponded with the value structure of authoritarians, they were more susceptible to the 
framing of the supporters compared to low or moderate authoritarians. Nevertheless, 
the main effect of the framing of the opponents of the naturalization proposal indicates 
that also high authoritarians were influenced by this communication strategy, although 
this framing contradicted their value priorities. How can this finding be explained in the 
light of the previous argumentation? One possible explanation is that high authoritar-
ians might not be so closed-minded that they automatically reject appeals that do not 
correspond to their value structure. This account is even more likely to hold when one 
considers that authoritarians must have received news stories that informed them that a 
majority of the Swiss people, most parties, and the government recommended the 
rejection of the proposal. This situation may have produced a conflict in high authori-
tarians. For instance, compared to most other people, high authoritarians place greater 
value on group membership (i.e., being Swiss) and are more submissive to authority 
figures (i.e., the Swiss government) (Altemeyer, 1994).
Part of this reasoning can be corroborated with the present data. In the survey, it 
was also asked whether voters followed the voting recommendations of parties, the 
government, or voted in accordance with the Swiss people. The data show that high 
authoritarians found the governments’ voting recommendation (r = .09, p < .05) and 
the opinion of the Swiss people (r = .32, p < .01) more important as guides for opinion 
formation compared to moderate or low authoritarians. Being in disagreement with the 
majority and with important authority figures must have caused dissonance. To solve 
this dissonance, high authoritarians may have been more attentive to the campaign. 
This heightened attentiveness and the need for dissonance reduction may have 
made them more susceptible for the news framing of the opponents’ campaign. 
Experimental results also suggest a similar process. For instance, when message 
recipients are exposed to unexpected message positions of communicators, then mes-
sage scrutiny is enhanced and strong arguments have a persuasive impact of attitudes 
(Baker & Petty, 1994).
Although this study offers important insights into the study of framing effects, 
some weaknesses must be recognized. In particular, the specific nature of the campaign 
under investigation makes generalizations difficult. In the present campaign, one camp 
relied on an obvious value framing strategy, whereas the countercampaign rather 
employed a mixed-message strategy consisting of material and value frames in com-
municating their messages. However, there might be campaigns in which value-laden 
appeals from both sides of the political spectrum collide. Alternatively, one can also 
imagine campaigns in which only material framing strategies clash. Based on the pres-
ent findings, one can only speculate about the likely effects of such campaign strate-
gies on voting preferences.
Another caveat of the present study is the strong assumption that the media content 
that we analytically matched to the survey respondents is really the content that they 
were exposed to. On one hand, the media content that was treated as the independent 
variable in the analysis might have been only a reduced amount of the campaign propa-
ganda that individuals really received through communication channels, for example, 
radio, Internet, or interpersonal communication. The impact of all these sources was 
not considered in the analysis. On the other hand, the media impact variables that were 
used may also overestimate the real impact of news reporting of the campaign. Our 
matching procedure assumed that survey respondents used the news sources regularly. 
Thus, this suggests that users of daily newspapers are exposed to newspaper informa-
tion every day. This assumption overlooks that news media users might not have been 
exposed to these sources as regularly as our matching procedure suggests. Another 
reason may be that the attention to a given source may have varied considerably from 
day to day. These sources of variation in our independent variables were not suffi-
ciently considered.
These caveats notwithstanding, the uniqueness of the present research design is a 
valuable means to unmask media effects that otherwise can only be detected in the 
laboratory. Therefore, it should also encourage other researchers to use similar designs 
aiming at the integration of media content and media effects research to test media 
effects in externally valid settings.
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Notes
1. There is another account for how framing effects occur. This model is called the importance 
change model (e.g., Nelson, Oxley, & Clawson, 1997, Slothuus, 2008) and argues that fram-
ing effects are not the result of the automatic accessibility of cognitions, but the intentional 
weighing of certain perspective that is provided by a news article. This is consequential in 
terms of the normative implications of framing effects. However, to date there are only a 
few studies that explicitly test whether framing effects result from automatic accessibility 
or belief importance change. The present research cannot resolve this issue. However, 
I come back to this issue in the Discussion section dealing with the normative implications 
of framing effects.
2. More specifically, the content of the following news sources was coded: Tagesschau, Arena, 
Le journal, SF Rundschau, Infrarouge, Blick, Sonntagsblick, Neue Zürcher Zeitung, NZZ 
am Sonntag, Tagesanzeiger, Sonntagszeitung, 20 Minuten, Aargauer Zeitung, Basler 
Zeitung, Berner Zeitung, Neue Luzerner Zeitung, Die Südostschweiz, St. Galler Tagblatt, 
Le Matin, Le Temps, Tribune de Genève, 24 heures, 20 Minutes, L’Hebdo, Punkt CH, 
Sonntag (AZ), Die Südostschweiz am Sonntag, and Le Matin Dimanche.
3. The reliability of the coding is .61 (Cohen’s Kappa). For the analysis, the specific codes 
for the arguments were summarized to broader categories (frames). These superordinate 
categories were less prone to error in the coding procedure (Cohen’s Kappa = .87).
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